Abstract: Web applications have become widely pervasive in all types of Internet-based services. Thus, security is one of the major concerns as most web applications suffer from vulnerabilities, making them attractive targets for security attacks. Structured Query Language Injection Attack (SQLIA) on stored procedures poses serious threats in the underlying database of any application. This article presents the methodological issues of developing a web application SQLI protector tool to detect stored procedures of SQLIAs. Our technique uses real-time settings based on positive tainting approach, accurate and efficient taint propagation and syntax-aware evaluation of the query strings at the application level are used to detect illegal queries before they reach the database. Then, the proposed tool is evaluated based on its efficiency and effectiveness in practices. In addition, detection techniques used are also analysed. The developed tool is effective given its capability to detect and stop all SQLIAs in a real-time environment.
Introduction
The internet comprises of widespread information infrastructures. Web applications have become an adequate access to online services via the internet (Shrivastava et al., 2013) . In recent years, web applications have become widely pervasive in all kinds of commercial, corporates businesses, institutions, organisations, numerous financial transactions, and other internet-based services (Prabakar et al., 2013) . Corporations and organisations are constantly striving to improve their communication capabilities by providing secured application level, which allows more sensitive and confidential information exchange between organisations using web applications (Halfond et al., 2011; Sadqi et al., 2015) . Web applications typically interact with backend underlying database. Hence, if an unauthorised user gained information by sending a malicious code, then the attacker could obtain illegal access, steal sensitive data of trusted users, and destroy or damage the system (Kindy and Pathan, 2012; Šuteva et al., 2015) . This attack can break the trust existing between the users and the server, as well as remove the feature of the absence of input/output validation on the server to reject malicious codes (Baranwal, 2012) . However, most web application developers are unaware of privacy and security issues. Thus, many kinds of attacks make web applications attractive targets for security attacks (Ali et al., 2015) . Additionally, web applications are frequently vulnerable to attacks, which result from poor design, configuration faults, or weak written codes (Kindy and Pathan, 2012) . These drawbacks can be exploited by attackers to gain confidential and sensitive data, and obtain illegal access to achieve their targets (Abaas et al., 2014) . The potential downtime and damages for application services, if any, could result in the loss of millions of dollars. This problem has prevented several applications with critical missions from going online (Halfond et al., 2011) . Thus, security has become one of the major concerns as most web applications suffer from vulnerabilities, making them attractive targets for security attacks. Web application security has become a great challenge in the recent years (Athanasopoulos et al., 2011) . A loophole in secure application design may lead to illegally accessing the backend database via crafted injection and malicious update (Prabakar et al., 2013) . Structured query language injection (SQLI) is one type of attack that is most in web application vulnerabilities (Mishra and Gond, 2013) . Structured query language injection attack (SQLIA) on stored procedures poses serious threats in the underlying database of web applications. Conversely, an attack can be programmed to execute stored procedures provided by a particular database, encompassing procedures that deal with the operating system (Halfond et al., 2006) .
Several techniques have been proposed to address SQLI problems. These techniques detect and prevent SQLIA. They include filtering, information flow analysis, penetration testing, development of best practices, and defensive coding to a fully automated framework (Halfond et al., 2006) . Other techniques used to solve SQLIAs require security awareness of the user, which cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, some of the existing solutions are unacceptably slow and can be bypassed. Furthermore, some are too restrictive, resulting in loss of functionality (Ankush, 2014) . Wei et al. (2006) proposed a technique to address SQLIAs in stored procedures, the proposed technique could eliminate the gravity in stored procedure attacks by combining the analysis of static application code analysis with runtime validation, SQL-graph is an offline procedure to abstract SQL query behaviour in web applications by using static analysis of source codes to the stored procedures (Wei et al., 2006) . This technique, however, did not extend to conducting a comprehensive implementation of the proposed prototype. SAFELI tool proposed by Lu et al. (2007) is capable of discovering delicate vulnerabilities by using source code information, however, it automatically enumerates SQL WHERE clauses by exploring algorithms and did not complete the implementation (Lu et al., 2007) . Likewise, Halfond et al. (2008) proposed an automated approach to counter SQLIAs in web applications by developing a prototype web application SQLI protector (WASP) tool that successfully and efficiently stops all kinds of SQLIAs without generating any false positive values (Halfond et al., 2008) . However, their experiment results did not extend the WASP tool in protecting web applications in a real environment. SQL-IDS tool presented by Kemalis and Tzouramanis (2008) is a query-specific detection approach that efficiently stops attacks without producing false positives or negatives. However, sources are not identified and checked in this approach, and sinks are subject to input validation and are flow sensitive. Furthermore, Bau et al. (2010) presented an automated tool that detects vulnerabilities via black-box scanners. Some limitations of these scanners include 'stored' detection in SQLI and cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities caused by difficulty of scanners in confirming a code or script injection to storage. In addition, the scanners have low detection rates in detection, resulting in both advanced and secondorder SQLI and XSS that indicates systematic flaws. A protection system for databases was presented by Yan et al. (2011) to analyse SQLIAs. The proposed system used database and application, and provided different protective measurements for administrators and ordinary users to ensure database security. However, the system could not prevent rare attacks (Yan et al., 2011) . Alserhani et al. (2011) proposed a model that detects SQLIAs, the success of alert correlation was due to the enhancement of identification of attack plans and reduction of graph complexities. However, the proposed model provided different inputs from the signature-based system, resulting to inaccurate results, it also ignored false positives (Alserhani et al., 2011) . The R-WASP tool, presented by Medhane (2013) , was capable of stopping all attacks effectively, but it required more practice to mitigate attacks on stored procedures efficiently (Medhane, 2013) .
The current research focuses on the analysis and resolution of SQLIAs in stored procedures. It aims to detect and stopped such attacks based on the concept of dynamic positive tainting and syntax-aware evaluation of web applications, developing a real-time web application tool. The research methodology involves four phases: primary, modelling, development, and evaluation to achieve the following objectives: 1 to investigate SQLIAs, and study how to detect and prevent such attacks on stored procedures, eliminating the lack of their approaches and highlighting their weakness
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The main contribution of this research is developing a WASP tool that has been proposed by Halfond et al. (2008) , which detects SQLIAs on stored procedures in real-time web applications. The results accuracy of the developed technique is evaluated based on standard performance metrics (false negative, and positive), whereas practical efficiency is assessed based on effectiveness metrics. Moreover, the efficiency and effectiveness of previous detection techniques are identified based on the comparison of standard performance and effectiveness metrics. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a clear description of the methodology phases, namely, primary, modelling, development, and evaluation. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of the proposed tool. Section 4 includes an empirical evaluation and analysis of the proposed tools that have been done to address and eliminate the danger of SQLIAs, with respect to efficiency and effectiveness metrics. Finally, Section 5 concludes and outlines the future scope and directions.
Methodology
Research refers to a method that solves problems systematically and scientifically. Thus, methodology scope is wider than methods in research (Kothari, 2004) . This section presents the methodology used in this research, explaining the particular method and technique used that depend on the web-based system. The research methodology describes the design and development of the propose approach. The methodology that will be used in this research comprises of four phases: primary study or investigation, modelling, development and proposal, and evaluation and discussion, as shown in Figure 1 . 
PHASE THREE (Development)
Evaluation of the developed tool
Conclusion

PHASE FOUR (Evaluation)
The research methodology aims to provide deep understanding of the study field. Figure 1 shows the four phases that explains the research methodology, achieving the research objectives presented in Section 1. The primary phase or phase one investigates the detection and prevention of SQLIAs in web applications and their limitations, achieving the first objective. Modelling phase or phase two identifies the various obstacles and factors through literature review, which leads to developing a tool that addresses SQLIAs more successfully. Development phase or phase three uses the result from phase two to develop and implement the WASP tool. A suitable detection tool that scans and detects SQLIAs on stored procedures is built in phase three based on positive tainting approach and syntax-aware evaluation. Finally, the evaluation phase or phase four evaluates and analyses the proposed tool according to efficiency and effectiveness based on results, which is explained thoroughly in Section 3.
Phase one (primary study)
Primary phase or phase one achieved the first objective by investigating the detection and prevention of SQLIAs in web application, and highlighting their limitations in terms of strengths and weaknesses. 
Process one
The detection and prevention of SQLIAs is investigated using dynamic tainting approach according to literature review. Previous studies provided details about the process of detecting and preventing SQLIAs, which could solve the limitations of past approaches, safeguarding databases against SQLIAs.
Process two
A detailed literature review on the general SQLIA impact on common attack types was performed to fulfil the objectives presented in Section 1. Most of the literature focused on detection and prevention techniques. Nevertheless, the current study specified on SQLIAs on stored procedures. It also highlighted problems in the previous works through literature survey and particular critical review.
Process three
Data for this research were collected from multiple sources. First, we searched for all SQLIA synonyms and used these terms as search criteria. The criteria were then applied to finding any obtainable study published in both the internet and in books, including papers, white papers, proceedings, technical reports, and other documents, as shown in Figure 3 . Additionally, we gathered all web application information in the same way. Thus, the research theorised the effects of SQLIAs in stored procedures and, how illegal access, which exploits sensitive information by gaining full control of the underlying backend database and manipulating it immediately, could be detected and prevented. The data collection methods used for this study was based on multiple sources, iteration and screen. The first attempt was aimed at finding all related Keywords and using them as search criteria. These criteria were used to find any available material. The selected main keywords related to the study scope were SQLIA, years (2005 to 2015), detection and prevention of SQLIAs, and SQLIAs in stored procedures. Searches on reliable databases, such as Web of Science (ISI), Science Direct, Scopus, and IEEE Explore, from 2005 to 2015 were performed. The first iteration result generated 140 articles were screened (title and abstract). Whilst, the results of the second iteration was 70 papers. Furthermore, 37 articles were results for the last iteration (third iteration). Subsequently, after excluded 17 references by the third screen3, we selected 20 common studies as the basis for our review and evaluation (Ali et al., 2015) . As shown in Figure 3 .
Phase two (modelling phase)
Modelling phase or phase two identified the various obstacles and factors through literature review, leading to a more successful development of tool that addresses SQLIAs on stored procedures. 
Process one
Identifying the various obstacles and factors (approaches or techniques) in related works would lead to building a more successful technique that addresses SQLIAs. Two of the existing techniques that are close to our proposed tool, as well as an existing work that solves more than one type of SQLIA, were selected, and their performance was evaluated (Ali, 2016) . The limitations of the previously proposed techniques are shown in Table 1 . Halfond et al. (2008) proposed an approach that mitigated SQLIAs on web applications, which depended on positive tainting via WASP tool at runtime (Halfond et al., 2008) . Conversely, Medhane (2013) presented a technique that detects real-time SQLIAs on web applications (Medhane, 2013) . Therefore, the proposed method aims to
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develop the WASP tool to detect the danger of SQLIAs on stored procedures in real-time environment (Ali, 2016) . 
Process two (definition of the design requirements)
This section describes clearly all the requirements that are necessary for the system development to detect SQLIAs. Software and hardware requirements are explained thoroughly.
User interface
UI is required for the interaction between the user and the system.
Hardware requirements
• Processor: P-IV-0.5 GHz to 3.0 GHz
• RAM: 1 GB
• Disk: 20 GB
• Monitor: SVGA
• Mouse: Two or three bottom Mouse
• Keyboard: Standard Windows Keyboard.
Software requirements
• Operating system: Windows 7/XP
• Development end: ASP.NET (with C# Programming language)
• Web technology: HTML, ASP.NET, and CSS
• IDE: Microsoft ASP.NET
• Database server: SQL Server 2008 R2.
Process three (propose methods and approaches)
The system aims to develop an automated technique against SQLIAs, which could readily stop access, and report injection attacks before queries reach the database and perform any damage on sensitive information. Figure 5 provides an overview of the proposed technique. The proposed tool would automatically transform a web application into its semantically equivalent, which would then protect the system from SQLIAs. Evaluation of the proposed tool under real-time environment is necessary. The proposed technique is called real-time web application SQLI protector (RT-WASP).
The RT-WASP aims to check if web pages and applications are in danger of SQLIAs. The tool scans the web page via URL-based SQLI error queries and SQLI keywords to identify a site that is vulnerable to SQLI. Furthermore, the site can be injected using the SQLI keywords (Ali, 2016) . 
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This phase presents and describes all the steps required to develop the WASP tool to achieve the aims in the research scope via scanning SQLIAs. The development of RT-WASP aims to detect web applications from SQLIAs in a real environment. The steps of developing the tool will be presented and listed in the following discussion. Most of the proposed techniques or tools that protect web applications from SQLIAs used traditional or negative tainting, or traditional dynamic tainting based on the untrusted strings of data during runtime. These untrusted data could not be prevented from being used. Unlike traditional dynamic tainting, the proposed tool is based on the concept of positive tainting, which marks and follows trusted data. Additionally, taint propagation in the present tool is efficient and accurate because of the precise tracking of the trust marker at character level. The technique also provides a syntax-aware evaluation to queries as tokens of strings, operators, and literals before the queries are sent to the database. The RT-WASP aims to check if web pages and applications are vulnerable to SQLIAs via scanning their URL based on SQLI error queries and keywords; websites can also be injected using SQLI keywords. 
Implementation
The RT-WASP aims to check if the web pages or websites and web applications have any vulnerable to the SQLIAs via scanning the web page by URL based on SQLI error queries and SQLI keywords to find out if the site in danger to SQLI as well as, the site can be injected by using the SQLI keywords. Figure 7 shown the detection technique used for server-side script manipulation by sending queries to the database source relational database management system (RDBMS). The injection process can be done by manipulating the sent client-side data, including changing of the SQL values and concatenations of the SQL statement to the web server embedded in HTTP requests. The scanning process to implement the RT-WASP tool, detecting SQLIAs, is as follows. First, the HTTP request sent from a set of online websites or applications is checked through the page extension for each URL page. Next, SQL statement or query is checked for any vulnerabilities to an injection attack, which could be done using an SQLIA detector. The SQLIA detector for each query includes two checking mechanisms: first is the checking of the injection point achieved by SQL lexical analyser or SQL parser to check the syntax-aware evaluation of the query string before sending to database management system (DBMS); and the second is the checking the probability of the injection by a literal validator that confirms whether web applications or sites could be injected with data keywords. After the SQLIA detector decides whether the query is benign or malicious, a legitimate query will transfer data to DBMS. Finally, the scanning process generates a report with all the information regarding the web page, such as page URL, injection point and probability, and the completion time of the scanning process. 
Testing
In order to, evaluate efficiency and the effectiveness of the proposed technique or (RT-WASP) tool using several different criteria. Firstly, test RT-WASP tool with 20 cases (websites pages) in order to, evaluate the RT-WASP tool by test each website page via put the page URL in the 'website address' text box and click on 'start scan' button in the UI of the tool (Ali, 2016) . On the other hand, examines all the website pages
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by send error query to check the predicated or expected results from the attacks, and then, compared with the actual results that came out from the tool end.
From the purpose of the testing, divided the tool testing table into two groups: expected result and the actual result. Each group have two subgroups: weakness in sensitive information and injection probability. From the perspective of expected or predicated result, weakness in sensitive information in the web pages URL, and the injection probability of the web page URL can be examined by, send error query keywords. From the perspective of actual result, weakness in sensitive information in the web page URL can be checked by the injection point if any by RT-WASP tool. Furthermore, checking the probability of the injection also by using proposed tool, and listed the time cost of the technique testing. Used different types of markings to indicate the come out from the tool or the technique in the actual result. The symbol 'T' denotes that the technique or tool has one of the weaknesses in the sensitive information, conversely. The symbol 'F' denotes that the technique or tool does not have any weakness in the sensitive information and so on so forth. As we see in Table 2 . Several points can be addressed from the testing results of the proposed RT-WASP tool via real-time settings. Most of the tested websites have weaknesses in their sensitive information and the probability of the injection in their results. Whereas, 15 sites that have lack with their sensitive data or injection point can be found in TC1-TC7, TC9-TC11, TC13, TC16, and TC18-TC20. Whilst, 12 sites have weaknesses in their injection probability results such as, TC1-TC7, TC10, TC11, TC13, TC16, and TC18. On the contrary, a few tested sites did not have weaknesses in their sensitive data or injection points for instance, TC8, TC12, TC14, TC15, and TC17. Furthermore, eight sites that tested were did not have lacks in their injection probability results such as,TC8, TC9, TC12, TC14, TC15, TC17, TC19, and TC20. Whilst, five only of the websites tested did not have any weakness in the sensitive information and the injection probability are, TC8, TC12, TC14, TC15, and TC17. 
Phase four (evaluation and conclusion phase)
Process one (evaluation and analysis for the developed tool)
Different criteria were used to evaluate efficiency of the proposed RT-WASP tool. First, RT-WASP tool was tested using 20 cases (websites pages), in which real results from the proposed attack detection tool were listed. Then, we examined all the website pages by sending an error query to check the predicted or expected results from the attacks. We then compared the findings with the actual results from the tool. To test further the proposed RT-WASP, we first evaluated the technique efficiency using the performance metrics (false negative and positive). Then, we evaluated the effectiveness of the technique by examining its capability to detect attacks and check for SQLIA probability (Ali, 2016) . RT-WASP has different characteristics in relation to effectiveness metrics. To determine the effectiveness metrics, we used the following guide questions:
1 Can the technique detect SQLIA?
2 Can the technique examine SQLIA probability, if any?
Evaluation based on performance metrics
To evaluate the efficiency of the detection technique or RT-WASP tool, two standard performance metrics can be used to examine RT-WASP detection technique against SQLIAs. These metrics are: false negative: How many SQLIAs can go undetected by this technique? False-positive: How many legitimate SQL queries are assessed as SQLIA and blocked? Both the false negative and false positive metrics are very important in measuring the effectiveness of the security mitigation for the detection technique. Evaluate proposed technique to assess whether, the technique or tool is efficient via comparing of the performance technique based on the standard performance metrics (false negative and false positive) and on the empirical evaluations in practices between the predicated or expected and actual results. From the expected result, the author examined each website page for weakness in sensitive information (injection point) and injection probability by send error query keywords. On the other hand, from the actual result standpoint, the result will be gotten from testing the proposed tool to the same purpose.
For the comparison point, divides the comparison table into two groups: expected result and actual result. Expected result has two subgroups: false negative and false positive. Table 3 summarises the performance metrics evaluation of the precision in practices. Moreover, use two different types of markings to indicate the technique performance. The symbol ' ' denotes that the web application or website has one of the metrics of that type of result. Conversely, the symbol ' ' denotes that a web application or website does not have any metrics of performance.
From the accuracy standpoint, Intent to assess each of the websites with respect to their precision (accuracy) results based on the performance metrics (false negative and false positive) for the predicated and actual results. Each of the web application or website had different results, to evaluate the precision of the results for each website based on predicated and actual results. Then, evaluates each web application or websites with respect to the criteria. The answers for these questions are summarised in Table 3 . TC1   TC2   TC3   TC4   TC5   TC6   TC7   TC8   TC9   TC10   TC11 TC12 TC13   TC14   TC15   TC16   TC17   TC18   TC19   TC20 The technique or RT-WASP tool has only two false-positive values in the results, which are: TC11 and TC20. On the contrary, the technique did not have any false-negative values in the results. The technique can detect all the SQLIAs in the websites. The technique has all most of the websites that are remarkable accuracy, which means that these do not have any false negative and false positive values in the implementation and testing. The evaluation results for the efficiency measurement (results precision) based on the comparison results between the technique results and the practical results for the standard performance metrics (false negative and false positive) can illustrate the technique have a few false positive, none of the false negative values, and can be protected all the websites or web applications against the SQLIAs in the implementation. However, the effectiveness of the technique needs to be measured via comparison based on other criteria prior to the conduct of the technique effectiveness evaluations.
Evaluation based on effectiveness metrics
The technique or RT-WASP tool has different characteristics in relation to the effectiveness metrics. To determine the effectiveness metrics that required in technique. First, evaluate the technique with respect to the following criteria:
1 Can the technique detect the SQLIA? 2 Can the technique examine the probability of the SQLIA if any?
The answers to these questions are summarised in Table 2, and Table 3 .
From the detection standpoint, the technique or tool could effectively detect all the websites or web applications of the SQLIA. As shown in Table 3 . Furthermore, the technique could effectively have examined or checked all the web applications or websites in terms of the probability of the SQL injection. As had shown in Table 3 .
Finally, can conclude that the technique is capable to detect the attacks of the SQLI in all websites or web applications effectively. Additionally, the technique is capable of examined or checked the probability of the injection in all websites effectively.
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Process two (conclusion)
From the perspective of RT-WASP tool evaluation results. Based on the evaluation results of the technique or tool that evaluated in evaluation section in order to, identify the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed technique, the proposed technique can be efficient and effective respectively. For the efficient standpoint, due to the proposed technique has few false positive and did not have any false negative values in their testing results, and incurs a negligible performance overhead. Whilst, from the effective standpoint, because the technique can detect the attacks and checked whether, the websites or web applications are vulnerable to the injection attacks.
Results discussion
The proposed RT-WASP tool is efficient and effective, based on its evaluation results in process one (Section 2.4.1). The proposed technique is efficient because it only had a few false positive values, and it did not have any false negative values based on its testing results; the technique also incurred a negligible performance overhead. Moreover, the proposed technique is effective because it can detect attacks and check whether the websites or applications are vulnerable to injection attacks.
Comparison of the detection techniques or tools based on efficiency and effectiveness metrics
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of most detection techniques or tools based on several different criteria. We first consider which technique is efficient by using the performance metrics evaluation (false negative and positive, and protocol overhead). We then evaluate the effectiveness of each technique by comparing them based on several types of SQLIAs. Finally, we identify the techniques that have efficient results and effectiveness based on the empirical evaluation of practices. We examine the description of the technique and its current implementation of the efficiency and effectiveness metrics.
Evaluation based on performance metrics
We evaluate each of the previously proposed techniques to assess their efficiency. The performances of the previously proposed techniques are compared based on standard performance metrics (false negative and positive, and protocol overhead) via their empirical evaluation in practices. We consider accurate techniques based on their false negative and false positive values in their empirical practical evaluation. Subsequently, we compare the techniques with the protocol overhead metric to evaluate their processing time and efficiency. We divide the techniques into three groups: false negative, false positive, and protocol overhead for comparison. Table 4 summarises the performance metric evaluations of the precision of the approaches in practice. We use two different types of markings to indicate technique performance. The symbol ' ' denotes that the technique has one of the metrics of that type. Conversely, the symbol ' ' signifies that a technique does not have any metrics of performance. We assess each technique with respect to its precision (accuracy) results based on the performance metrics (false negative and positive, and protocol overhead), as shown in Table 4 . Several results are found through comparing techniques. We evaluate the precision result for each technique based on the following criteria:
1 Does the technique have any false negative in the implementation?
2 Does the technique have any false positive in the result and throughput?
3 Does the technique have protocol overhead in the process and implementation?
The answers to these questions are summarised in Table 4 . 
Evaluation based on effectiveness metrics
Each of the techniques has different characteristics in relation to effectiveness metrics. We evaluate each technique to determine their effectiveness based on their ability to detect all SQLIA types, which is presents and summarises in Table 5 . Overall, the different types of SQLIAs are not performed separately; many are used together or sequentially based on the intention of a specific attacker. SQLIA types are tautology, illegal/logically incorrect queries, piggy-backed queries, stored procedures, inference, and alternate encoding. Other types are automated or code-suggestion, real-time, and dynamic or static analyser. Our assessment of the techniques is optimistic compared to their performances in practice. 
Real-time Dynamic analyser
Static analyser
Most of the techniques (stored procedures, SAFELI, WASP, SQL-IDS, and the proposed (RT-WASP) addressed all SQLIA types effectively. Some techniques (ARDILLA, and R-WASP) were only partially effective and failed to handle all SQLIA types. Most of the techniques, such as stored procedures, SAFELI, WASP, and ARDILLA, were not conducted in real-time settings. Only three, namely, SQL-IDS, R-WASP, and our technique RT-WASP were conducted in real-time environment. Almost all of the techniques (stored procedures, WASP, ARDILLA, R-WASP, and RT-WASP) were based on dynamic analysis, whereas only SAFELI and SQL-IDS were based on static analysis. 
Comparison based on efficiency and effectiveness results
We evaluate each proposed technique to assess its efficiency and effectiveness based on the number of criteria, as summarised in Tables 4 and 5 , respectively. Efficiency evaluation is based on the false negative and positive, and protocol overhead values in the results; whereas effectiveness evaluation is based on the capability of a technique to stop all different types of SQLIAs. Based on the results, SAFELI, WASP, and SQL-IDS are efficient. Stored procedures, SAFELI, WASP, SQL-IDS, and RT-WASP showed possible effectiveness. The results from the comparison between the two metrics (efficiency and effectiveness) illustrate that SAFELI, dynamic tainting (WASP), and SQL-IDS can be effective and efficient. However, stored procedures, ARDILLA, R-WASP, and RT-WASP cannot be effective and efficient.
Conclusions
Web applications are used for most activities in animation. However, these applications suffer from injection attacks because of their poor design, configuration faults, and loopholes in their written code. These injection attacks affect the trust existing between the users and the server. They also remove the feature of the absence of input/output validation on the server to reject malicious codes. Thus, we developed the RT-WASP tool to detect SQLIAs on stored procedures in a real-time environment. Then, we evaluated and analysed its practical efficiency and effectiveness. Performance metrics of the previously proposed detection techniques were compared to evaluate their precision and efficiency. We also evaluated the techniques based on effectiveness metrics.
Specifically, we evaluated the efficiency of our technique based on the values of false negative and positive in the results. The effectiveness of the proposed technique was measured based on its capability to detect attacks and check the injection probability or website vulnerabilities. We also evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of the previously proposed detection techniques or tools based on several different criteria. We first considered technique efficiency using the performance metrics (false negative and positive, and protocol overhead). We then evaluated the effectiveness of each technique based on various types of SQLIAs. The proposed technique can be efficient and effective, respectively, based on evaluation. Conversely, we found several general trends in the results. A few of the previously proposed approaches have protocol overhead that refers to the runtime cost. Half of the proposed approaches have a few false positive value, but they do not have a false negative value. A few of the techniques, such as stored procedures, can address all types of SQLIAs. Conversely, most of the techniques can detect SQLIAs. In conclusion, only a few techniques (SAFELI, dynamic tainting (WASP), and SQL-IDS) have good efficiency and effectiveness results. In the future study, we will focus on two immediate goals. The first goal is to improve the performance of the proposed tool (RT-WASP). Further, we plan to extend RT-WASP tool to encompass both of SQLI and XSS attacks in web applications. The second goal is to ensure the effectiveness of RT-WASP technique. We will develop the proposed tool to detect and prevent SQLI and XSS attacks on stored procedures.
